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LAW AND HUMAN NATURE : THE SOCIAL-ADAPTIVE FUNCTION OF THE
NORMATIVE BEHAVIOR

Abstract: The objective of this article is to offer a critical (re)interpretation of genesis and evolution,
object and purpose, as well as useful qualified methods for interpreting, justifying and applying modern
practical law, all with the intention of putting philosophic thought and contemporary formal theory of
reason at the service of hermeutics and juridical argumentation. Law is no more—no less—than an
social-adaptive strategy, evermore complex, but always noticeably deficient, used to articulate
argumentatively—in fact, not always with justice—through the virtue of prudence, elementary relational
social ties through which men construct approved styles of interaction and social structure, i.e., to
organize and ethically improve political and social life in such a way as to permit that no free citizen—
rich or poor—should fear the arbitrary interference of other social actors in his life plan.

Atahualpa Fernandez

1.

Problems in an analysis of the law from the perspective of

the nature/culture interaction

Many centuries of debate on the origin of the law (and ethics) could be
reduced to the following alternative: either ethical and juridical precepts, such as
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Justice and human rights, appear thanks to human nature with the results that there
are some innate rules on the behaviors and some universal morals determined by
our nature, or these ethical and juridical precepts are socially constructed human
inventions in the sense that nothing exists in the world of the law and ethics outside
human agreement and disagreement.
The distinction, as we will see further ahead, assumes something more than
a mere mental exercise for jurists and academic philosophers. The choice of one of
the hypotheses makes an important difference in the way it in which we see
ourselves as a species, establishes a measure of the legitimacy and the authority of
the law and the normative announcements, and determines, in the last instance, the
conduct and the sense of practical ethical juridical reasoning.
The doubts still to be solved about the origin of the law present an apparent
problem:

the search for

alternative means between natural law and juridical

positivism – but above and beyond both - has generated an explosion of productive
creativity in very diverse investigation areas (ranging from philosophy to science of
the law, and juridical argumentation, sociology, juridical hermeutics and many others)
and have attracted the attention of a growing number of investigators of recognized
prestige and removed the jealousy from the different disciplines. This is a problem
because, as often happens when the structure of an area of work and investigation
alters suddenly

and radically,

consternation and disorientation have been

generated. The new concepts and the arguments about them have proliferated to
the point that, on the one hand it has become very difficult, if not impossible, to
maintain an informed and global perspective. Furthermore, the general evaluation
criteria that permit judgment of these new concepts and arguments have become
weak and vulnerable. The result of these inconveniences can be seen, for example,
in the intellectual revolution that the cognitive sciences are causing.

Something

similar is happening with innovating speed in philosophy and science of the law.
In the midst of this torment of academic production, the extraordinary
proliferation of investigations and publications that in the last decades has directed
interests towards the reflection about the relationships that exist between cognitive
science and evolutionary biology on the one hand, and sociology, social normative
philosophy, anthropology and cultural evolution on the other, deny the existence of
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unviable frontiers in the territory of science and question the idea that the “cultural
reality” is constructed outside the natural determinations.
Although much of the social sciences and many of the law operators still
remain outside this new multidiscipline reality, it has started to jeopardize much of
the traditional theoretical concepts of the normative social sciences and of juridical
science itself. It makes the proposal viable (and even the demand) that new criteria
for the knowledge sectors in law should be revised in the light of recent studies from
evolutionary psychology, evolutionary biology, primatology and neuroscience.
Flexible behavior facilitates the acceptance they hypothesis that the
juridical, social and human sciences will obtain more benefits if they set out from a
vision linked to the biological

nature of man, following in the steps of the

transformation of philosophy of the mind as part of the cognitive sciences, that if they
remain in the theoretical and methodological isolation since the

juridical

professionals pay little attention to the foundations of human nature and no interest
whatsoever, in practice, to its deeper origins. In other words, the theoretical gaps
that are a problem to these professionals have been imposed by the little attention
they have given to individual behavior that originated from the intersection of
sophisticated cognitive problem with the social and cultural environment in which we
move.

2. Why does the law exist?

If the need to change a paradigm is accepted, it seems reasonable to
sustain that all operative forms destined to evaluate the problem of the juridical
phenomenon from the perspective

we could call naturalist should begin with a

question: how is the law possible? or in other words, what is the function of the law in
the context of human existence?
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The conventional Neo-Darwinian explication sustains that the possession of
behavior norms is an adaptive advantage, so that the original question about why we
create the law, becomes what has constituted (or constitutes) the selective or
adaptive advantage of the law. Not being able to answer this question, the presence
of the law in the universe of human existence will continue to be an enigma open to
the most disparate suppositions.
The truth is that such a focus could be qualified as extreme adaptationalist.
Perhaps the norms of the law are, in their origin, a subproduct of other unknown
adaptive functions on which they rest. But it is certain that, if the juridical proposals
need determined brain mechanisms to be processed, the reason for the existence of
these mechanisms must be explained.
Moral and social behavior is guided, in deepest terms, by our integrated
cognitive architecture functioning in specific modules or dominions, whenever we
understand these as neuronal networks that link various zones of the brain. In most
part this architecture is innate, but it needs environmental stimuli originating in the
first instance from the social and linguistic surroundings to be completed during the
ontogenetic maturity of the individual. Thus only interactionist models between the
innate substrate and the environment can describe accurately describe phenomenon
of obtaining the neural structures whose functional behavior is translated into facts
such as the juridical morals, the values assumed by an individual and decision
making, with the juridical values in the first instance because of the focus of this
study.
Our evolution as a species took place, as far as we know, by Darwinian
mechanisms and according to Darwinian limitations. In consequence, the nature of
the human being on the ground circumscribes the conditions of possibility of our
societies, in particular, guiding and limiting the institutional and normative set that will
regulate the social relationships. The norms and values assumed by human beings
appear within a very complex adaptation process (Darwinian), to the everyday world.
Unless we accept some theological proposals about the supernatural origin of
axiology, any normative social (or juridical) theory that intends to be worthy of credit
nowadays must sustain itself in a Darwinian model about human nature (Rose,
2000).
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3. Neuronal bases of social and moral behavior

If we accept the previous statement, we arrive as the causal chain that
justifies part of the process of the appearance of the law.

It has to do with

circumstances and phylogenetic evolution, fixed already in our ancestors of the
Homo genus, from some brains big and complete enough to sustain the cognitive
architecture that allows us to make evaluative choices regarding behavior. But the
undoubted obtainment

during human phylogenesis of some bigger and more

complete brains shows an enigma.

Given that the neural tissue is the most

expensive in terms of biological and energetic needs (Aiello & Wheeler, 1995), it
cannot be believed that it was obtained accidentally.

There must be important

benefits derived from the possession of larger brains.

About what are these

benefits? What do they consist of?
The

response

can

be

found

searching

for

the

appearance

of

phylogenetically fixed behavior. Other species with a certain social complexity solve
their adaptive needs by other means. Extreme altruistic behaviors have appeared
during the evolution of living beings on our planet at least four times in the so-called
“social”

species: the hymenoptera (ants, wasps, bees, termites), the parasite

“prawn” of the anenomies and sea corals (Synalpheus regalis, Duffy, 1996), the
hairless “rates-moles” (Heterocephalus glaber, O´Riain, Jarvis & Faulkes, 1996) and
the primates (with human beings as the best example). Neither the social insects,
not the rats nor the parasitic skunks have a language like ours. Their means of
communication can be very complex. Bees, for example, perform a specific dance
exercise to transmit information about food location and quality. The animals in the
species closest to the humans, the chimpanzees, have a variety of gestures, shouts
and other conducts to show or dissimulate fear and aggressiveness, and at times
show a certain sense of justice, show desires to congregate and maintain complex
sexual relationships (de Waal, 1996).

But they never use a double articulation

language with syntactic structure.
Language can thus be considered the key to tracing the adaptive benefits
capable of assuming an adaptive pressure on the big brains in the human beings.
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The linguistic ability unique to our species, that is the most important tool for
culture transmission, brings us certain clear advantages in the strategy of social
survival that the more simple communication systems could not sustain. Without
doubt we follow, without knowing why, the adaptive advantage of the human
language is great to the point that we are allowedto know “who did what to whom”.
We can predict in terms of well-defined conduct the consequences of our congeners
but, at the same time, we are not able to give a precise definition of justice or to
decide in which aspect the theory of natural law is preferable to that of a more
tranquil positivism.
To try to understand and overcome the traditional obscurity of theoretical
discussions on analysis of law whose best perspective is functional, that is, that
which starts from an assumption of (and sometimes reductionist and/or eclectic)
axiological, sociological or structural perspective, without trying to elucidate only for
what the law serves in the environment of human existence. The functional starting
point does not oblige us to resort to the rhetorical expedient (the traditional relativist)
of conditioning juridical knowledge to the obscure limits of the revelation of some
theories that transcend understanding and the human experience itself. It is not
necessary to assume the existence of independent juridical truths that our
intelligence is not able to process and understand, nor do we have to assume as
unapproachable the reason that justify the existence of the law as one of the
essential aspects of group life.
Once the establishment of the law is situated in an evolutionist and
functional dimension, it seems reasonable to start from the hypothesis (empirically
fertile) that the law appears and is justified by the need to compete successfully in a
complex social life.

When our hominid ancestors faced

the adaptive problems

associated with complex group life, the selective pressures appeared in favor of
cognitive processing organs capable of managing the universe of norms and values.
We insist that this is a hypothesis. But it is at least the same that justified the type of
social behavior and cognitive abilities of other primates (Humphrey, 1976). Thus the
functional and adaptive optimization of the interaction mechanism would appear of
certain elementary forms of sociability that seemed to be rooted in the structure of
our mental architecture.
What would be these forms?
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When trying to answer many of the questions about the way in which the
organization of the human mind affects social relationships and conditions our moral
institutions, Alan P. Fiske (1993) stated that there are four elementary forms of
sociability, for elementary models by which human beings construct some
consensual way

of social interaction and social structure.

The four elemental

models proposed by Fiske are the following: 1) communal sharing; 2) authority
ranking; 3) market pricing; and 4) equality matching. These four structures are found
in a very extended form in all the human cultures examined by Fiske and are part of
the more important areas of social life. As the only possible explanation of this fact,
the author suggests that they are based on the structures of the human mind.
As it seems unthinkable to treat the juridical relationship (or rather, the
personal relationships of the human individuals that the juridical discourse identifies
as such) without taking social interaction as reference, a simple examination of the
characteristics of the four types of relational social ties proposed by Fiske allows us
to discover firm articulation of these forms of social life: agreed ways of combining
them, of enhancing and cultivating their best aspects, and mitigating and judg
ing
their destructive and dangerous aspects.

This practice has an important

consequence: as one admits that the law and “order” are relational in character, the
realization of the law from an instrumental,

pragmatic and dynamic perspective

comes to be conceived as an intention, as a technique to solve determined practical
programs related to behavior and intersubjective interference of the individuals
(Kauffmann, 1997; Atienza, 2003).
The best way of obtaining the shaping the elementary forms of sociability communal sharing, authority ranking, market pricing and equality matching - would
be to develop suitable juridical instruments for their fair and balanced articulation. It
is, definitely, a way that leads to considering the law as argumentation and assumes,
uses and in a certain way, gives meaning to the other theoretical perspectives
related to the structural, sociological and axiological dimensions of the juridical
phenomenon. Consequently it seems reasonable to assume that a new theoretical
proposal of juridical discourse should consider the circumstance where the
argumentation is made in juridical life is, in essence, an argumentation on the
various means by which the four forms of social life are articulated based on the
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complex structure of the human mind and irreducible among themselves (Atahualpa
Fernandez, 2002).
A Darwinian explanation of the evolution of the law understood in this
manner assumes that the conduct norms(in this case, of

a juridical nature) will

represent a selective or adaptive advantage for an essentially social species, such as
ours, that otherwise would not be able to prosper. Such norms shaped the need to
possess an operative mechanism that would publicly enable our innate capacity to
infer the mental states and predict the behavior of individuals. In this way social
knowledge would be increased among the members of the group and the ability to
solve social conflicts developed without having to resort to forms of hierarchy and
social organization typical of many animal species, such as aggressiveness.

A

juridical normative mechanism assumes the possibility of offering solutions for the
practical and active problems surrounded in a non conlfictive way the fields in which
the individual interests can be valid and exercised socially (Ricoeur, 1999).

4. The perspective of the “other”: advanced cooperation

There is a key element that deserves analysis to obtain in the human
phylogenesis a mind/brain set to capable of producing, understanding and using the
normative universe as a tool for individual adaptation within the group and of that
group itself within its environment: the understanding and anticipation of the
reactions of the “other”.
Recognition of the other in social life is linked to the recognition of the self.
The ability for self interpretation is inseparable from the acquisition of the ability to
interpret others, to read their minds, to understand them and understand ourselves
as intentional beings. Although reflective individuals, we come to know ourselves in
part through the eyes of others, and when we observe ourselves in relation to the
others a very important part of our experience is our imagined vision about how the
other members of the group see us.
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This ability for self observation through someone else´s mirror is one of the
bases of human social life and the essence of the true meaning when we call
ourselves social beings.

Indeed it is also a crucial point in some of the refined

mathematical models of the evolution of the social agents. For example, Nowak and
Sigmund (1998) offered a simulation model of the development of corporative groups
in which indirect reciprocity in help was obtained by effective cooperation and by
thanks of counting on a cooperator “image” (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998, Wedekind,
1998). We will immediately return to this point.
We can only speculate on how the mental faculty of identifying the “other”
as an intentional being was fixed in the homonid evolution, but there is signal that the
need to adapt to new open habitats in the African savanna by the use of stone
utensils in hunting and carroñeo tasks could be assumed to have been sufficient
selective pressure to establish strong social tendencies and favor the ulterior
advance of the cognitive abilities related to communication and symbolic association.
This is the same as saying that the neurophysiological basis for language, thought,
purposeful intercommunication and mind reading could have begun not in the final
stage of hominization, with Homo sapiens, but rather in the initial moments in the
Homo habilis species (Tobias, 1987a; Tobias, 1987b). Besides it may be the correct
model of early acquisition of individual and distinctive cognitive abilities in the Homo
genus, it is certain that within this genus and especiallyfrom Homo erectus extra
alometric increases were produced in the brain (greater than that of the increase in
body size). Terrence Deacon has made even more precise the hypothesis pointing
to certain changes in the frontal cortex -already in Homo sapiens - as responsible for
the appearance of the complex human cognitive abilities (Deacon, 1997; Deacon,
1996).
The frontal cortex houses functions such as planning and decision-making
that seem to be derived more from the need to interact with the members of this
complex social group than the need to

solve other problems related to the

environment. It could be said then that one of the main pressures that led humans to
evolve in the form in which they have were humans themselves in their social
dimension. It has always been much more difficult, since the beginning, to be able to
predict the behavior of the person beside you than the succession of the seasons in
the year, repeated systematically throughout the centuries. The same reasons as
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those that we mentioned before regarding the need to justify the appearance of
expensive brain tissue apply in greater force to explain the last expansion of the
modern cortex in human beings with modern appearance.
It is probable that the best reason for the great neocortex development in
Homo sapiens should refer to a cognitive phenomenon linked to the recognition of
the other and the valorization of his behavior: the treatment of reciprocity understood
as humans “own function”.
The idea of “own function” was coined by Ruth Millikan in 1984 and refers
to the essential and exclusive constituents of the manner of acting of our species,
that is considered linked to the nature itself of any human being regardless of
temporal or geographic differences. According to Domènech (1998), the last Hayek
was very concerned with the implications of such a concept, because he saw in the
existence of “own functions” of our moral institutions a threat to the ultraliberal social
order defended by von Hayek. As he said : “man’s innate instincts are not for a
society such as that in which we live. Instincts are adapted to life in small groups
(...).

Civilization has brought only individualization and differentiation.

Primitive

thinking consists basically of sentiments common to the members of the small
groups.

Modern collectivism is a fallback to this

savage state, an attempt to

reconstruct the strong ties that are found in limited groups” (von Hayek, 1983: 164165). But the discomfort that a concept like this may produce is not the real problem.
The essential question is how much own functions can be detected and documented
in the origins of human socialization and to what extent these functions continue to
mark the territory of moral intuitions as a group living system. Because of this, the
intention of avoiding the “wild state” meaning “natural” could become not only a
great but also very dangerous mistake.
Can these human “own functions” be documented?
The needs to infer and predict the behavior of the others, maintain social
cohesion and intragroup cooperation and solve routine problems of survival,
reproduction, social interchange in group life in our species have led to the fixing of
very subtle mechanisms to assess group attitudes. The problems the existence of
egoists camouflaged as altruists present to a group of cooperators and the need to
identify and punish who assumes a such social role, is an aspect which has been
discussed frequently in sociobiology and ethology. Indeed studies by Cosmides et
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al. suggest that natural selection could have fixed certain circuits in the human brain
specialized in analysis of social interchange, capable of detecting deceitful behaviors
(Cosmides ,1989; Stone, Cosmides, Tooby, Kroll & Knight,2002; Sugiyama, Tooby &
Cosmides, 2002). Thus the establishment of co-operative contracts would be more
than a universal cultural tendency: it would suppose a human trait characteristic of
our species, as characteristic as language and abstract thought. It would indeed
signify the main factor of conditioning and development of the cognitive abilities of
people, relationships, motives, and the emotions and the intentions that are
manifested in social environment.
According to Ridley (1996), reciprocity weighs like the sword of Damocles
over the head of each human being: obligation, duty, debt, favor, adjustment,
contract, exchange, business ... there is no shortage of ideas of reciprocity and
social exchange in our language and our lives. What the others do with (and for) us
and think of our behavior is very important for our moral attitudes. Thanks to the
principal of reciprocity and reasoning in terms of social contract, cooperative
relations have become a practical base of social life. The sense of debt, of the need
to return any gift or favor, seems to be universal and probably corresponds to an
innate predisposition evolved in a language, in the Homo genus, whose social ties
were established in a hunter-gatherer world where daily survival depended on the
degree of social interchange and strength of the cohesion of the social ties created
among the members of the group.
In truth, one of the most important consequences of the pioneer
experiments by Cosmides referred to previously is the fact that they obtained firm
indications that the formation of a contract is not the product of a single rational
faculty that operates equally through all the agreements established among the
parties that negotiate. The process includes an ability, the detection of deceit, that
has been developed to exceptional levels of acuteness and fast calculation. The
detection of the “deceiver” stands out over the detection of the simple error and
raises the basic question of the establishment of social relationships, altruistic or not.
Thus a contract is an implication of the form “if you want to obtain a benefit, you have
to meet a requirement”. The deceivers who intended to take the benefit without
meeting the requirement (Pinker, 2000) should be able to be detected.
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The ability to detect is set in motion as a computational procedure only
when the costs and benefits of a social contract are specified. More than the error,
more than the good reasons, and more even than the margin of benefit, what calls
attention is the possibility that others deceive us: something like this activates our
moral intuitions and feelings and is the main source for the appearance of hostile
attitudes; in short deceit imbalances the four relational social ties

1) communal

sharing; 2) authority ranking; 3) market pricing; and 4) equality matching in our social
interchanges. Thus the human mind seems to possess a lie detector with its own
logic: when the standard reference “clean game” and result of the lie detector
coincide, people usually act (although not always) following the rational logic
established by the Homo oeconomicus model; when the references and the
detection are different, another type of thought appears to punish the deceivers. In
reality the concept of deceit can reach very subtle values.
Let us consider the so-called ultimatum game, where a first actor A1 must
offer to a second actor A2 part of the sum of money that was offered to the first, so
that if the second accepts the offer both obtain their reward but if he refuses it, both
end up without anything.

An idea of rational human logic would lead to the

understanding that A2 should accept any quantity that A1 offers; after all, it is always
be more than nothing. But it does not happen like this; because below a certain
percentage share, the subjects of the experiments refuse the agreement. Perhaps
the most interesting regarding the identification by Sanfey et al. (Sanfey, Rilling,
Aronson, Nystrom & Cohen, 2003) of the brain areas implied in this root decision
directly linked to a sense of justice: the result are the same as, in the model by
Damasio of the somatic marker (Damasio, 1994) are part of the neural network of
frontal limbic interconnection.
Our minds, say Sober and Wilson (2000), were formed by psychological
mechanisms that evolved to favor adaptive behavior related to the interest in the
well-being of others and with the typical predispositions of any species designed to
be social, trustworthy, and cooperative.

Human beings are immersed in social

instincts: they come into the world equipped with the predisposition to learn to
cooperate, to distinguish the just from the deceitful, to be loyal, to earn a good
reputation, to exchange products and information, to share work and to model their
individuality and social ties from the reactions of the other. In this respect we are
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unique. And in large measure we are this way thanks to the way in which our brains
function.

5. Mental Modularity

How do they do it? One of the most complex and also one of the most
interesting aspects for any investigation that aims to study the functions of the
human brain is its modular character. The most decided hypothetical proposal about
the existence of brain modules to process determined mental functions was carried
out within the so-called “cognitive functionalism” by Fodor and Chomsky. It weighs
the great differences that the module theory of one and another establish (see Cela
Conde & Marty, 1998), the main points in common that should be considered for the
purpose of this article are (1) the mind is a functional state of the brain (that implies
denial of any dualism that, as Cartesian, gives

the mind an ontological statute

separate from the biology of the brain and independent from it); (2) brain events that
lead to mental functions take place by computational processes (they are therefore
based on the “activated” or “deactivated” state of the basic elements that
interconnect: the neurons); (3) each cognitive function can be considered a “module”
of our mental architecture (the equivalent of a dominion-specific “organ”: language,
numerical capacity, etc.);(4) the modules function from mostly innate brain
components (they also need environmental elements to reach maturity of the mental
organs during the ontogenesis of the individual).
Mental modularity has been understood in many ways, as we say, by the
different authors of computational functionalism. The most interesting exposition of
the effects that are dealt with in this article is by Noam Chomsky, for two reasons.
The first, that its cognitive architecture is highly compatible with the findings of the
neurosciences. The second, closely related to the first, is that there are empirical
descriptions about the neurological components of such mental organs. But before
entering in details it is interesting to consider a crucial aspect: the interaction among
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the brain processes and the formed environment, that in our species refer to a group
in strict social living.
Let us consider a very well-known mental function: language. The Chomsky
model of development of the linguistic competence passes through the presence
some of the abilities in the genetic components of human nature that give any
newborn the possibility of developing a determined language. These components
must be strong and complete enough to allow the language creator of great syntactic
and semantic precision to be installed in a very short time - a few years - and without
a specific learning program. But the innate components cannot be so wide as to
impose the grammar of a particular language. Any child, of whatever that ethnic
group, will learn the language of the group in which it grows up in.

The social

dimension of language therefore imposes its rules.
Can the same competency development model be extended to other mental
models/organs? The reply seems to be affirmative. The brain reaches maturity
during ontogeny also regarding any other mental module or “organ” and not only by
that of language. It seems reasonable to admit, therefore, that our valorizations are,
for the most part, the result of the dominions in a permanent state of interaction:(A) a
set of genetic determinations that stimulate us to maintain moral attitudes, to assess
and prefer, and that belong to the common genome of our species; and (B) a set of
moral values of the group that is a cultural construction so that this value
construction (and transmission) takes place historically in each society and in each
epoch. A universe of preferences results from the interaction where one is not free
to take just any path. Our valorizations are determined in by great traits by the innate
tendency to determined conducts, that can be considered the true source of human
values.

It is important to bear this in mind because shared moral and juridical

valorizations have the most likelihood of success in the future. It seems convenient
to use this fact, as far as possible, at the time of elaborating ethical and normative
precepts.
As Antonio Damasio (2001) stated, ethical values constitute strategies
acquired for the survival of the individuals of our species, but such acquired skills
have a neurophysiological support in the base neural systems that execute the
instinctive conducts. The brain processes that are related to the emotions are deeply
articulated with those that perform assessment calculations, on the establishment of
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neural networks that connect the frontal lobe with limbic system. Thus if the ethicaljuridical choice is based on assessment reasoning and also on emotion and moral
sentiments done by the brain, it cannot be considered as totally independent from
the constitution and the functioning of this organ acquired in the evolutionary history
of our species.
Therefore we find ourselves with the very important role of social life: that of
directing the innate human component towards certain specific dominions. Imagine
many evolutionary banners under which a similar scheme, of interaction between the
individual nature of beings that live in a group and the presence of collective cultural
values, provide ingentes

adaptive advantages.

But within this multitude of

hypotheses there is one that should be considered immediately: the law as part of
the social environment. The “juridical certainty” can be understood very well within
the model as a social and cultural solution for the adaptive problems related to the
capacity and need to predict the actions of the members of the group and their
consequences.
The origin and evolution of our “contractual behavior”, that is, of the law as
an artifact of culture, allows us to understand that the moral precepts and juridical
norms are the result of a long road of adaptation and to the long time passed since
the appearance of our species. Cultural transmission has been adaptive since its
origin by permiting that the individuals diminish time and costs necessary for learning
a conduct in terms of evolutionary efficacy (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). The same
can be said regarding the cultural artifact called law.

6. The natural universe of the law

As intentional beings, any human action, that is, any movement, any
thought, any sentiment or emotion that is intentional, responds to the specific form as
natural selection modeled our brain giving us an adaptive advantage. The objectives
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of our actions are reached by strategies directly linked to human nature, without loss
– clearly - of admitting wide variations resulting from insertion in the social cultural
group in which we live. Culture influences both to accentuate or decrease the most
deeply rooted tendencies of human nature.
This double action of nature/culture has produced, during the long course of
our evolutionary process, some strategies and mechanisms designed to solve
determined adaptive problems. If they fulfill their purpose, we say such mechanisms
and strategies are valuable (they are good) and as such, are capable of
accumulating traditions that, always in a continuous line of renovation, are
transmitted from generation to generation based on individual actions of people
influenced by this triple set of elements from nature, culture and history both modern
and ancient, of humanity.
Given this situation, of such ample temporal and cultural diversity, the
hypothesis that all human beings without significant exception tend to valorize as
good the same thing will lead to the statement thatit cannot be because we have not
all agreed on the goodness. Such a shared value would be based on the natural
psychology of the human species by giving an effective solution to the adaptive
problems of the moment.
Do such universal values exist that are either positive or negative?

All

human beings seem to valorize, for example, intragroup cooperation, but at the same
time distrust intragroup cooperation when the proposal comes from outside. We
value group cohesion, kinship relationships, submission or obedience to a leader, the
ability to rise in social hierarchy, altruistic conduct, child protection and education,
strategic alliances, friendship, sex, moderate unruliness, exchange relationships,
controlled risk; we value sincerity, but also reciprocity and safety and we hate deceit
and injustice - at least when they affect us personally. There is only one explanation
for this: because evolution by natural selection produced a human mind with the
parameters necessary for us to behave in this way typical of our species.
Natural selection modeled our brain with the result that we care more about
some things than others. Our cognitive architecture - functionally integrated and
dominion-specifically homogeneous for all human beings - imposes strong
constrictions on the perception, storage and discriminatory transmission of social and
cultural representations. In other words, the limits observed in the diversity of the
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ethical and normative announcements are the reflection of the structure and
functioning of our cognitive architecture. The biological characteristics of our brain
establish the space of the norms of conduct that we can learn and follow. This
principle, defended in the so-called “second social biology” (Lumsden & Wilson,
1983) follows from other proposals prior to the style of Waddington and the
epigenetic landscapists. It implies that if the cultural solutions are contingent and are
historical in character, they moved within some narrow possibility limits set out by
human nature. We tend to valorize certain things in detriment to others and the
values guaranteed by our conduct norms describe (in most part) our natural moral
aptitudes: we value that which admits outside of our limited capacity to learn to
value it.
Unlike that established by the Homo oeconomicus model, that encourages
us to behave morally and juridically is not the deliberate calculation that doubt among
the possibilities of obtaining a certain benefit on complying with an established norm
and the risk run of being discovered and punished for error. Nor do we function on a
conscious adhesion to rationally analyzed and accepted norms.

Certain moral

intuitions and sentiments come into play surreptitiously, spontaneously, without us
realizing the error: empathy, remorse, shame, humility, sense of honor, prestige,
compassion, companionship.
As we have shown, such intuitions are based on innate predispositions of
our cognitive architecture for learning and manipulation certain inherent social skills
inherent to brain biology, skills that appeared during the evolution of our hominid
ancestors to avoid or prevent the conflicts of interest that arise in group life. These
traits, that we could call tendencies more than characteristics, that best illustrate the
origins and the reality of man´s moral and juridical behavior.
Indeed if men get together and live in society it is because it is the only way
in which they can survive. In this way specific social values have developed: the
feeling of belonging and loyalty to the group and its members; respect for life and
property; altruism; empathy; anticipation of the consequences of actions ... they are
practices that appear as necessary in the course of common daily life that later give
way to the concepts of justice, moral, law, duty, responsibilit y, freedom, equality,
dignity, guilt, security and betrayal, among many others.
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What counts in the end is the fact that the tendency to separation between
the material and spiritual has led to the absolutism of some of these values distancing them from their origins and from the specific reasons that created them
and presenting them as transcendent entities above and beyond human beings,
ethics and law only acquire a solid base when they are linked to our cognitive
architecture structured in specific dominion modules, that is, from human nature
based on genetic inheritance and developed in a cultural environment. It therefore
could be said that the codes of the human species are a peculiar consequence of
our humanity itself, and this, in turn, “constitutes the basis of our cultural unity”
(Maturana, 2002).
The axiologic and normative project of an ethical community is no more than
a cultural artifact manufactured and used to enable the survival, reproductive
success and group life of the individuals. It also serves to express (and much to
control and/or manipulate) our intuitions and our moral emotions, translating and
composing in social adaptive formulas of living together the instinctive aspiration of
justice that has moved us throughout the evolutionary history of our species. From
this the juridical norms dictate sexual practices, foment certain types of social
relationship ties in detriment to others, regulate freedom and equality and prohibit under certain circumstances - aggression and violence.
It seems inescapable that we must accept the fact that we are the result of
two different processes, whose confluence, if we can call it this, constitutes us as
humans: a biological process of hominization (the sum of mutations, recombination
and natural selection by which Homo sapiens is distinguished from the species that it
descends from) and a historic process of humanization (by adding different keys to
the purely biological: rules, moral, language, culture, civilization). The two processes
are very juxtaposed as different and even antagonistic; the example of the position
of von Hayek mentioned previously against the “own function” of the human being.
It is probable, however, that this translation of the classical opposition nature/nurture
developed from a mistake: that the historical cultural constructions and the biological
evolution events are independent processes.
An interesting negation of this supposed isolation between nature and
culture, sustained by the second social biology, establishing the appearance of both
human nature and the cultural expressions of the values of cohesion of the group
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through any coevolutionary model and coordinated evolution among genes and
culture (Lumsden & WIlson, 1981). The model of coevolution sustains, for example,
that the normative cultural representations related to subjects of sex, family and
power trigger strong reactions and are more prosperous in terms of “genetic
replication” because they concern aspects of great importance in our evolutionary
past (Brody, 1996).
It is not easy to go beyond the theoretical model sustained by a strong
mathematical apparatus by Lumsden and Wilson. How could you prove the empirical
effect of the presence of social relationships on the fertility of the group of
Australopithecus, for example? But it is also a speculative hypothesis, the sense of
an evolutionary process of some beings who, from the small bands of 70 to 150
hunter-gatherers on the savanna, whose survival depended directly on the
maintenance of social cohesion, progressively multiplied and concentrated
themselves: first in small towns and later in large nations until transforming
themselves in a “global society”. Indeed this is, except for the distances, the same
scheme that led to the great ideal of universal citizenship by the illustrious Kant and
Goethe and that, certainly, is very different from the neoliberal globalization process
of our times.
In any case the phenomenon is accompanied by an accelerated increase
both in the knowledge and complexity of the relational social ties and structures especially what the existing information and communication systems do among the
members of our species - that permits a much faster and wider interaction among
the social groups and at the same time, requires a substantial increase in the
integrating norms of common action.

In the end, as has been said before, the

progressive increase in the complexity of the reciprocal interchange required, (and
continues to require) an adaptive strategy based on an ability to predict evermore
sophisticated conducts.
Thus we arrive at the human laws, this blind cultural and institutional tool,
virtually neutral and with potential linking ability to predict and regulate human
behavior whatever nature or degree of imperativeness.

It seems reasonable to

suppose that, as happens now, there existed continuous norms for the exercise of
rights in all human societies (although they were very precarious on occasion) on the
part of the members of the group. Norms capable of establishing the rules of living
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together regarding power, property distribution and use, family structure or some
other community entity, work distribution and exchange regulation in general. Norms
that, to solve certain adaptive programs, shaped the collective environment and
historically conditioned our ability and innate need to predict the behavior of the
others and justify our actions.
As it seems to have occurred with biological evolution, the evolution
process of the norms did not take place linearly without trial or error. Human beings
are characterized by trying different normative solutions and adopting those that
seem most efficacious at a certain moment, until they are sustained by others. As
flexibility in human contact and the diversity of the cultural representations are,
although limited, wide and, on the other hand, given that the cultural alterations can
be transmitted very quickly and efficaciously, the process of normative evolution is
subject to great leaps and bounds and even, at times, significant declines. It is this,
perhaps, the best evolutionist explanation of the so-called unjust laws.
Our relational social ties are, as a result that is difficult to deny, deficient
and our ability to predict and anticipate the consequences of actions is far from
perfect, but it is in any case better than nothing. Without norms we would not have
evolved; at least not in the form that we did. But we have the law and, with it, we
promote in some groups as complex as man the means necessary to control and
predict good and bad actions, to justify the collective behaviors and what is most
important, to articulate, combine and establish limits on the four elementary models
of relational social ties, communal sharing, authority ranking, market pricing, and
equality matching. Thanks to the juridical universe, shaped in the last degree on
explicit codes, human beings manage in their own interaction of social structure a
partition (Which should be called, with the necessary caution about the concept,
“consensual”) all of the rights and duties that arise in community life.
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7. Consequences of the evolutionary concept of law.

The first hominids appeared as African monkeys in an environment that has
been identified as the typical tropical forest both in the Rift Valley and South Africa
(Rainer, Moon & Masters, 1993; WoldeGabriel et al., 1994). With bipedalism as the
distinctive trait, millions of years later our ancestors became colonizers of the open
African savannas in a process that coincided with the appearance of the first stone
industries and the first examples of the human genus, that is, Homo habilis and its
olduvail culture (Leakey, Tobias & Napier, 1964). A panorama like this indicates that
the first evolutionary transformations fixed by natural selection took place under very
different ecological and cultural circumstances from those we have today. But it was
then that the process began of forming a mind equipped with modules that process
all of the cognitive contents pertinent for adaptation in a group.
It is impossible to establish the origin of the law, even if understood in the
most wide and flexible manner imaginable. But we have sustained that this origin
has to do with an adaptive challenge that human beings faced: a challenge that
came from the human need to understand and valorize his congeners behavior, to
respond to it, to predict and manipulate it and, from this, establish and regulate the
most complex relationships of life in a group. Other species such as the chimpanzee
suffered very similar selective pressures and even so, did not develop our systems of
norms established by explicit periods. There is little doubt therefore about the unique
character of the law as a tool to solve group conflicts. But the distinctive character
does not mean that the law is free from any type of trace that arises from the specific
circumstances in which the coordinated evolution of the human brain, of the hominid
groups and of their cultural solutions were produced. Moral sentiments derived from
our innate cognitive architecture and from the ethical and juridical codes, that arose
as products of the interaction of biology and culture.
But is an important to understand that it is a process of mutual inferences,
so that the first normative expressions must have changed the development
environment of social intelligence. Understood from this viewpoint, the laws are not
simply a set of spoken, written or formalized rules that people follow. They represent
the formalization of behavioral rules, on which a high percentage of people agree.
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They reflect the behavior inclinations and offer potential benefits to those that follow
them.

When people do not recognize these potential benefits the laws are,

frequently, not only ignored or disobeyed but their compliance becomes conditioned
to authority that the laws impose by means of brute force (Margaret Gruter, 1991).
Similarly, we formulate value choices about to the just and the unjust not by
calculated reasons, as the games theory and the juridical interpretations theory
express, but rather because we are equipped with certain innate moral intuitions and
certain emotional stimuli that characterize human sensitivity and allow us to connect
potentially with other human beings. Thus the virtues of tolerance, compassion and
justice are not political formulas that we strive to reach but rather commitments that
we assume and hope that others assume. If we understand the Law beyond the
formal expression of the codes, is not an intellectual construction. It appeared as
part of our nature from a longand tortuous evolutionary process and, to understand
it, we should look to the inside, to the way the mind/brain set processes instincts and
the predispositions that permit the creation and exploitation of the relational social
ties already existing and whose genesis should then be reintegrated in the
evolutionary history of our species.
If it was inevitable that Hobbes and Rousseau lacked an evolutionist
perspective, it is less pardonable that some of their intellectual descendents also
lacked it.

The philosopher John Rawls - although at the time dealing with the

problem of stability of the principles of justice starting from the assumption that
certain evolved psychological principles are correct, at least approximately – asks us
to imagine rational beings that come together to create a society from nothing, as
Rousseau imagined a solitary and self-sufficient prototype human being. To be sure
they are intellectual experiments but are they based on reasonable requiresments. It
does not seem so. To speak of a starting point prior to society is absurd. Current
human groups were born from groups of Homo erectus and these from groups of
Australopithecus, and these in turn, from ancestors common to humans and
chimpanzees that were probably some animals with a certain social life.
Thus it must be defended that between the world of the “is” and the world of
the “should be” there is a manifest and intimate relationship, sufficient reason to
consider our ethical faculty as an analogue of other mental faculties. Admitting that
the dominion-specific diffusion of the ties of

communal sharing, authority ranking,
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market pricing and equality matching exists because they are incorporated
necessarily in our cognitive architecture (forming ties that support the universal
divisions in culture), is the safest way to discover the basis of the juridical means of
explanation and articulation of social human conduct and of the relational social ties.
Once it is admitted that all law has a relational character, and all juridical relation
resides, in the final analysis, on a social relationship –that is one of the four
elemental models of relational social ties established by man, which, in their turn,
always have the individual as subjects, the function and finality of the juridical
discourse consists both of the combined articulation of the referred relational social
ties and of the duty of each operator to act in reason of the person and for the
human person. In other words, law is no more and no less than a social adaptive
strategy - ever more complicated but always insufficient - used to articulate by acts
that are qualified as “valuable” the relational social ties through which humans
construct acceptable interaction systems and social structurization
.
This kind of artifact induces - or should induce - the design of a normative
and institutional model that prevents arbitrary domination and interference in a social
environment full of asymmetries and inequalities, ensuring a certain material
equality, and, in the last instance, stimulating and guaranteeing ownership and the
exercise of rights (and performance of duties) of every inalienable point and that
publicly acknowledges the existence of citizens as completely free individuals.

8. From natural law to positive law

The task of the juridical-interpreter is to give “hermeneutic life” to positive
law derived from such a conception.

A common mistake in the naturalist

interpretations of the law - if they are of transcendent or Darwinian origin - consists in
understanding that human nature contains what we could call the final product of the
law. Such an explanation is rarely given, but it is a necessary conclusion whenever
we expound the determination of moral conduct and the ethical choices regarding

supra individual instances, that are of genetic and theological order.
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If nature

necessarily leads to a precise “moral sense”, then this moral condition is guaranteed
without the need for any individual action.
The interactionist models we have studied and defended deny this
dependency. The dominion of human preferences is, as we have said many times,
the result of the maturation within a social group and with understanding of historical
events, maturation that leads from the general constrictions to the perception and
storage of the cognitive representations to the final -and very plastic – repertory of
the activity patterns of our brain and those which emerge in our conduct.
Human nature imposes what we could call the “rules of the game” but not
the final result.

The most significant, however, of the naturalist approach is the

possibility of fixing, within these rules of the game, certain high ranking values that
stem from the character of the law as an instrument for social life. For much of the
cultural diversity and the facility of acculturation allow the imposition of part of almost
any juridical rule - and history shows us a catalog of proposals that led to monstrous
situations - the “aberrant” rules are basically contrary to the moral intuitions fixed by
natural selection. Given its evolutionist viewpoint, Rawls´ Theory of Justice is based
on this assumption.

The human being possesses a moral quantification system

which permits him to qualify as good

not any action he performs unless very

concrete: those in which “good” means “good for everyone” (Tugendhat, 1979).
This does not mean that the “good for everyone” ideal has always been
complied with, nor does it assume it will always be complied with in the future. But it
establishes a line of moral progress: the one linked to the ever greater extension of
the group called “everyone”. If in the Aristotelian epoch the moral doctrine included
only citizens, and in the Putney Bridge debates citizens are the category which
includes those without material possesssions, it is not untill the XX century that
“everyone” means in at least countries - half of humanity: that there is the female
sex. A line of progress around the universal concepts of “good”claims, for example ,
the intention to prevent or diminish human misery and unhappiness (that suffering is
not produced when it can be prevented, and that inevitable suffering is minimized
and effects the individual members of society, the citizens in moderation).
Indeed, the success or failure of humanity depends greatly on the way in
which the institutions that govern public life are able to incorporate the perspective of
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human nature in principles, methods and laws. Understanding human nature, its
limited rationality, its emotions and its feelings seems to be the best way toformulat e
an institutional and normative design that, reducing human suffering, permits each
one to live (to to live with the other) in a search for a common humanity.
This means, in modest and more realistic terms, a specific and virtuous
commitment - in the sense of Machiavellian virtue – on the part of the law operator at
the time of defining and constituting institutional, normative discursive and social
cultural designs as close as possible to the functions of our intuitions and moral
emotions.

And when this is not entirely possible, that they define institutional

normative discourse and social cultural designs opposed to the always possible
perverse manipulation of these intuitions and emotions. The institutional model that
best reflects, of all those we know
, the ideal of this lawgenerated by an evolutionary
interaction of biological nature and culture is the democratic republic defended by
the illustration.
And not only because the Republican tradition is capable of recognizing
plurality in the motivations of human social life - something that assumes a notable
initial advantage regarding the motivational monism of the Liberal tradition, - even
because its open peculiar will of ethical-political model brings citizenship values and
useful juridical political methodology to understand law as an instrument of social
construction and, especially, to simulate the formal and material exchanges of the
decision taking process within the fluid dynamic of the world of everyday life.
We are convinced that the time has arrived to transport the problem of law
to a different and more fruitful plane. And although an evolutionist, functional and
biological perspective cannot determine whether this exchange is adequate nor that
measures should be taken to create, in the case of opting for it, a desirable mutation,
it will certainly serve to inform on questions of practical relevance. Who operates the
law can act in unison with human nature or against it, but he is more likely to obtain
efficacious solutions (consensual and controllable) modifying the environment where
human nature is developed than undertaking the impossible task of altering our
nature by these means. In other words, it is the law that has to serve human nature
and not the contrary.
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